A global Microsoft service interruption that began on Thursday, 12 November, was still disrupting British public services on Friday, 13 November 2026. Health regulators, inspectors and emergency-service agencies issued separate notices about failures to send or receive email or use associated online tools. The consequences have extended beyond office inconvenience: some organisations cannot receive ordinary correspondence and have directed urgent cases to telephone lines.

The Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) reported email problems but said that its public-safety responsibilities were continuing, with phone lines working. Ofsted took a different approach, asking people not to send emails or submit online forms during the interruption and to call instead for urgent matters. The notices, both dated 13 November, show how the same external failure can affect separate public services in different ways.

Which services are affected, and which are still functioning?

The Maritime and Coastguard Agency confirmed that it was having difficulty sending and receiving email. It said search-and-rescue operations had not been affected. An interrupted inbox therefore does not automatically mean that a frontline emergency service has stopped.

NHS Greater Manchester separately instructed patients to attend scheduled appointments unless told otherwise, and to telephone the relevant service when an online channel was unavailable. It said accident and emergency departments remained open, though waiting times for minor conditions could be longer. It directed people needing urgent advice to NHS 111 and those facing life-threatening emergencies to 999. These are locally published continuity instructions, not a promise that every digital application in the health service is working.

Independent reports describe wider strains. The Guardian reported problems in hospitals, GP practices, pharmacies and several police forces. Some healthcare workers were using paper records or other systems where possible, while pharmacy representatives warned that trouble communicating with practices could delay prescriptions. Those accounts show operational disruption at specific organisations; they do not establish that the entire NHS has gone offline.

Key facts

  • The Microsoft disruption began on 12 November and continued into 13 November, with email among the affected Microsoft 365 functions.
  • Ofsted asked people to avoid both email and online forms temporarily, while urgent enquiries could go through its phone line.
  • The MHRA and Maritime and Coastguard Agency reported email failures but said their core public-safety and rescue duties remained available.
  • NHS Greater Manchester said medical appointments should proceed unless patients are contacted and advised differently.

Why a shared software failure creates distinct public-service risks

Email and collaboration systems often connect agencies to the public, suppliers and each other, but their operational dependencies differ. An inspectorate may need a functioning form to receive new reports. A regulator may lose routine communication even when its safety functions remain available. Healthcare teams can still deliver appointments while experiencing delays in scheduling, referral messages or pharmacy communications. A public notice should therefore be read by organisation and service, rather than extrapolated to all public functions.

The disruption is also transatlantic: Microsoft services were affected internationally before Britain's Friday morning announcements. The Guardian reported that Microsoft had observed early stabilisation and a gradual return of mail traffic. That is a preliminary recovery signal, not confirmation that all regions, mailboxes or delayed messages have returned to normal.

The underlying cause had not been conclusively established in the sources reviewed. A Microsoft executive said there was no indication of a cyberattack. That statement is an interim assessment, not a completed root-cause report or final account of why multiple services became unavailable.

The next substantive updates should distinguish restored access from backlog clearance and show which agencies have reopened affected channels. A form or email that appears submitted during disruption may not yet have been delivered or processed. For organisations and users alike, the episode illustrates how resilience depends on working alternatives and clear service-specific instructions, not only on the supplier recovering its central platform.